We examine how self-set normative goals and selective information about others' behavior shape cooperation and punishment in social dilemmas.
We find that self-set goals can curb free-riding, but the effect is fragile. On the other hand, negative information about other groups' past behavior can trap a group in low cooperation, even when that information says nothing about their own group.
Can people restrain their own temptation to free-ride by setting themselves a normative goal for how much to contribute to a joint project? In “The Fragility of a Nudge” (Journal of Economic Psychology, 2020), we test two such self-set normative goals in a public goods game. Focusing on a minimally-acceptable contribution level is effective at restraining free-riding in an initial study, but the effect does not reliably replicate across two further studies, and is not strong enough to affect already fairly cooperative groups - suggesting a fragile nudge.
In “Managing Expectations: How Selective Information Affects Cooperation and Punishment in Social Dilemma Games” (Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2021), we examine how learning selective, favorable or unfavorable information about the past cooperativeness of other, unrelated groups shapes a group's own cooperation and punishment decisions.
Cooperation depends heavily on this pre-play information, through its effect on players' initial beliefs. In a cooperative environment, unfavorable information does the most damage; in a uncooperative environment, favorable information does the most good. Critically, groups that receive discouraging information early on tend not to recover over time, even though the information said nothing about their own group.
Together, the two studies show that both self-imposed goals and information about others are potentially powerful but fragile levers for sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas.
Publication in peer-reviewed journal
