Project «Communication and coordination in a two-stage game»
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular, we analyse whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take turns strategy can emerge. Firstly, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposing options at both stages of the game. Secondly, many adopt a take turns strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Thirdly, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution regardless of whether communication is unilateral or bilateral.
Published in Economic Inquiry
- Tjaša, Bjedov, Associate Professor, Swiss Distance Learning University, Switzerland
- Thierry, Madiès, Professor of Economics, University of Fribourg, Switzerland
- Marie Claire, Villeval, Professor of Economics, University of Lyon, CNRS, GATE, France
- University of Fribourg, Switzerland