Project « Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups? »

Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level within a smaller group reduces the likelihood of individuals voting in favor of a configuration that includes no global good /for/?when?/ interacting only within their local group. Voting for such a configuration is more likely when global group members are less cooperative and local group members are more cooperative. Reinforcing local group identity has no impact on votes.

Duration
January 2014 – May 2018
Published in Social Choice and Welfare

Collaborators

  • Tjaša,Bjedov, Associate Professor, Swiss Distance Learning University, Switzerland
  • Simon, Lapointe, Senior Researcher, VATT Institute for Economic Research, Finland
  • Thierry, Madiès, Professor of Economics, University of Fribourg, Switzerland
  • Marie Claire,Villeval, Professor of Economics, University of Lyon, CNRS, GATE, France

Funding

  • University of Fribourg, Switzerland

Link

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-018-1133-5

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